The Truth About Reform: Are They Far Right?

Their Leaders deny it, their supporters take offence when called it - yet over 60% of British voters agree that Reform UK are ‘Far Right’ So what is the truth?

Is Reform UK an authentic far-right movement? Following Reform’s gains in English local council and mayoral elections,¹ I saw two incompatible world views clashing online. One, concerned about the resurgence of the far-right.² Another strenuously in denial that Reform UK is far-right at all.³

Online discourse is full of fragmented and incompatible world-views, and diversity is normally a strength to be celebrated, but I wanted to definitively get to the bottom of this. This is not some subjective ‘agree to disagree’ point. Both views can’t be true.

I was confident there must be a definitive answer, so I determined to find out.

Methodology

At the chasm of these clashing views lie two disputes. First, a conceptual contestation “what exactly does “far-right” mean?” Second, an epistemic argument: “Do Reform UK meet the agreed-upon definition?”

In this article, I want to rigorously examine whether Reform UK fits the profile of a far-right party. I first draw on academic definitions and criteria used by political scientists and extremism experts, as well as common usage and understanding, to identify what characteristics make something ‘far-right’.

Then, once the criteria are established, we can conduct a methodical evaluation of Reform UK – analysing its ideology, rhetoric, leadership, and the behaviour of its candidates and supporters – to see if they meet our benchmark of far-right politics.

There is, of course, a challenge that over time different officials may contradict themselves and each other, or claim quotes are taken out of context, so I have endeavoured to look for general repeated patterns over time, and to link back to sources.

The goal is a reasonably comprehensive, evidence-based assessment that cuts through the noise, legal threats and online discourse to come to as definitive an answer as possible.

Is Reform UK far-right, or is the label hyperbole?

Who are Reform UK?

Reform UK is the successor to the Brexit Party, which filled the shoes of UKIP - all led at one point by Nigel Farage, and all using textbook populist rhetoric to brand themselves as patriotic representatives of ‘the people’ challenging an elite establishment.

Its leaders and supporters get their hackles up when they are labelled “far-right”. Former leader Richard Tice has threatened legal action against media outlets for using the term.⁴ Farage insists he is “neither racist nor far right”, positioning Reform UK as a party of ‘common sense’ rather than extremism.

Many of their voters seem shocked to think that they have voted for a far-right party, because what they see does not fit their understanding of what ‘far-right’ means.

Yet as we will see, Historians, Political scientists,⁵ Unions,⁶ anti-extremism charities,⁷ opposing parties,⁸ international media,⁹ and most of the British public disagree. ¹⁰

The term far-right carries heavy historical baggage, evoking stereotypical images of fascist blackshirts and Nazi salutes. This association is so strong that many assume, or claim, that unless a group openly idolises Hitler or wears swastikas, it doesn’t qualify.

“...if recent polls are anything to go on, the party is backed by nearly a third of British voters, Surely they can’t all be Fascists.” ¹¹

Patrick West - The Spectator

But as we will establish, far-right is a much broader umbrella term than fascism; it encompasses a range of nationalist, nativist, and anti-democratic ideologies that can just as easily manifest in suits and slogans as in skinheads and swastikas.

Simply - All fascists are far-right, but not all far-right are fascists.

What Does “Far Right” Actually Mean?

“The best working definition of the contemporary far right may be the four-element combination of nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, and welfare chauvinism proposed for the Western European environment by Cas Mudde.”

Lubomír Kopeček - The Far Right in Europe ¹²

The term “far right” is often used loosely in public debate, but political scientists and extremism experts have developed widely accepted criteria for what it encompasses.

Piero Ignazi¹³ was one of the first political scientists to develop a coherent framework for classifying far-right parties in post-war Europe. In his 1992 book The Silent Counter-Revolution,¹⁴ he distinguishes between ‘Old Far-Right' - the traditionally Fascist & paramilitary and the 'New Far-Right' parties who are nativist and majoritarian while rejecting liberal democracy.

Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, Professor of Political Science at the University of Bergen, argues that anti-immigration sentiment is the common denominator uniting otherwise diverse populist radical right parties across Western Europe. In a comparative study of seven successful cases, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?” she found that nativism, rather than economic anxiety or social conservatism, was the key to their appeal.¹⁵

Professor Cas Mudde is one of the world’s leading scholars on extremism. He is an adjunct professor at the Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo,¹⁶ co-founder of the ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research) Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy.¹⁷ He has taught on the Radical Right movement in Europe at DePauw University,¹⁸ is associate professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia and is the author of several books on right-wing politics, populism, and extremism.¹⁹

He explains that radical right parties “accept the essence of democracy, but oppose fundamental elements of liberal democracy”, whereas extreme right groups “reject popular sovereignty and majority rule outright.”²⁰ Noting that while sometimes the extreme and radical are used interchangeably, in other contexts they are clearly distinct - for example, in Germany, there is a legal distinction between the verfassungswidrig and the verfassungsfeindlich. The radical ‘unconstitutional’ and the hostile ‘anti-constitutional’.²¹

Mudde’s work expands on that of Ignazi.²² However, I feel Ignazi’s choice of terminology too heavily implies a chronology - using it, we might see the new presented only ever as a more modern evolution of the old. I feel by using Mudde’s radical/extreme terminology we can better see that they can exist in parallel, can overlap in membership and ideology, and that a fascist ‘old far-right’ style movement could emerge from a ‘new far-right’ one, as we are seeing in the United States with Trumpism.

It also helps us to establish that it is inaccurate for the verfassungswidrig to deny they are ‘far-right’ simply because they are not verfassungsfeindlich. That would be like a Pinot noir denying it is a red wine, simply because it isn’t Merlot.

So in academia and political science far-right is an umbrella term that includes both the extreme right or ‘old far-right’ - those that fundamentally reject democracy and often embrace violence, such as fascists. And the ‘radical far- right’ or new far right - illiberal, nationalist movements that broadly operate within electoral democracy while pushing illiberal agendas.

These are the characteristics of the Far Right.

So, what core ideological and structural traits define a far-right party? Taking Mudde’s four criteria as a basis, finding common ground with Ignazi and Iversflaten and sense-checking with research by institutions like Stanford University’s Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISIC),²³ the University of Oslo’s Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX),²⁴ we can identify a consensus of diagnostic common characteristics.

1. Nationalism, Nativism and Xenophobia

Where Nativism is the belief that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group,²⁵ Xenophobia fuels the narratives used to exclude non-natives from that imagined community.²⁶ Indicators of nativism in practice include dehumanisation and welfare chauvinism.

Nationalism

This is non-civic nationalism, a cultural nationalism that often defines national identity in narrow, ethnic or religious terms. The radical far-right can stop short of the openly biologically racist ‘ultranationalism’ of the extreme far-right. Far-right groups typically hold an exclusionary belief that “true” citizens belong to a particular in-group (e.g. white Britons or native-born Christians) and that outsiders (immigrants, ethnic or religious minorities) are a threat to the nation’s cohesion or purity. This nativism frequently manifests as hostility to immigration and multiculturalism, and the notion that outsiders are to blame for societal ills. Such ideology may include notions of racial or cultural superiority and stoke fear of a “Great Replacement” by foreign populations.

Dehumanisation

Far-right rhetoric often overtly or subtly dehumanises certain groups. Whether it’s antisemitic conspiracy theories, Islamophobic tropes, anti-Black racism, or anti-LGBTQ+ bigotry, far-right movements single out “Others” as dangerous, inferior, or degenerate. Scapegoating is common: minorities or immigrants are blamed for crime, economic decline, or moral decay. Explicit racist or xenophobic language may be used, but paralipsis or coded dog-whistle messages are also a key indicator. (E.g., references to non-whites as “invaders”, to Asylum Seekers as ‘Criminals’ or claims that Muslims are inherently violent.)

Welfare Chauvinism

Many far-right parties often cloak their nationalism in economic terms through welfare chauvinism – the belief that social welfare should be reserved for the native-born population, excluding immigrants or minorities regardless of their contributions. Cas Mudde explains that while many radical right parties support the welfare state, they advocate that it should serve only “our own people” – a form of state-sponsored in-group preference that reinforces nativist ideology.

“Their argument is that the welfare state is good but it needs reform. While other conservative parties want to reform it by taking away certain things, they want to reform it by kicking non-natives out of the welfare state system. They often have slogans like, “Our own people first,” which means giving “national preference” in benefits”

Cass Mudde - Vox²⁷

This manifests in slogans like “British jobs for British workers” or proposals to restrict benefits to “citizens only” regardless of actual tax contribution or need. It’s a tactic to moralise exclusion, presenting the in-group as hard-working and deserving, while casting the out-group as parasitic or opportunistic. As such, welfare chauvinism operationalises both nativism and xenophobic resentment, becoming a central plank in many far-right manifestos.

Xenophobia and nativism are two sides of the same coin - the positive lionisation of the natives, and the demonisation of the others.

2. Authoritarianism and Law-and-Order Obsession:

Far-right groups typically favour a strong, forceful state - but only in areas they care about, like policing and borders. They exhibit a psychological preference for order and hierarchy. They often attack the checks and balances of liberal democracy – independent courts, human rights laws, and press freedom – as ‘obstacles’ to the will of the majority or the will of the true people as embodied by their leader.

Anti-democratic tendencies can include glorifying strongman leaders, calling for the suspension of parliament or using draconian emergency measures,

They also tend to be isolationist, seeking to withdraw from international commitments and allies.

"They’ve never supported a global free market; what they stand for is economic nationalism. The economy should always be at the service of the nation."

Cass Mudde

While radical far-right parties usually stop short of openly abolishing elections, they often undermine democratic norms in subtler ways, e.g. questioning election legitimacy, voter suppression, Gerrymandering or encouraging majoritarian tyranny while scrapping minority protections.

Far-right movements tend to be centralised and leader-driven, with less internal democracy than mainstream parties. Structurally, far-right parties tend to coalesce around charismatic, polarising leaders. From Viktor Orbán to Donald Trump, the leader’s persona often embodies the movement. Internal dissent is minimal; the party is run top-down.

3. Populism and Anti-Elite Conspiracy Thinking:

Many contemporary far-right parties are populist, meaning they cast politics as a battle between the virtuous chosen “ordinary people” and a designated corrupt, tyrannical “elite.” As Mudde defines it, populism is a “thin ideology” that paints society as divided into two antagonistic camps – “the pure people” vs. “the corrupt elite” – and says the government should simply enact the general will of the people.

Far-right populists add a toxic twist: their “elite” often includes globalist or leftist conspirators (e.g. George Soros, the EU, mainstream media) who are portrayed as betraying the nation.

Conspiracy theories thrive in these far-right circles, from the “Great Replacement” (claiming shadowy elites are importing immigrants to replace native white populations) to anti-vaccine and climate-change denial narratives. This conspiratorial, anti-establishment worldview serves to both demonise opponents and justify drastic action as “saving the nation” from hidden enemies.

Populism also loves simple, hardline policy proposals. Gross oversimplifications that can be encapsulated in a short sound-bite slogan and that promise quick fixes – “close the borders”, “take back control”, “ban the burqa”, “lock her up” &c. – reflecting a low tolerance for nuance, debate or compromise. This absolutism ties back to their authoritarian and black-and-white thinking - their world is a dichotomy. Always seen as patriots vs. traitors, natives vs. invaders, those for us or those against us, with little to no middle ground or grey areas.

4. Rejection of Pluralism and Minority Rights:

A hallmark of new far-right ideology is that while it may accept voting, it fundamentally opposes liberal democracy’s commitment to protecting universal human rights, equality, and pluralism.

Far-right parties often seek to curtail the rights of certain groups (e.g. immigrants, religious minorities, LGBTQ people) in the name of restoring homogeneity or ‘traditional values’. They frequently attack principles like equality before the law or “political correctness”, which they view as elite-imposed rules silencing the majority.

In essence, far-right movements accept majority rule but not minority protections, so they are majoritarian rather than liberal democrats. This can manifest as proposals to withdraw from human rights treaties, scrap anti-discrimination laws, and otherwise enable the “will of the majority” to trump minority interests.

These criteria, taken together, form a profile, our framework, our diagnostic pattern of the spectrum of far-right politics. Not every far-right party will check every box – there is variation across countries and movements – but broadly, this same pattern of nationalism, xenophobia, authoritarianism, populism, and illiberalism is consistently observed by scholars and monitoring groups.

Methodical Evaluation: Does Reform UK Fit These Far-Right Criteria?

To determine if Reform UK is truly far-right, let’s examine how it measures up on each of the defining characteristics outlined above. We will scrutinise the party’s ideology, rhetoric, and conduct – from official manifestos to off-the-cuff remarks, from leader speeches to rank-and-file social media posts, from official statements to the beliefs of their voters – and compare them to our far-right diagnostic checklist.

1. Nationalism, Nativism and Xenophobia

Reform UK has built its platform on hardline nationalism and anti-immigrant nativism. It has done this to an extent unprecedented in postwar British politics outside perhaps Enoch Powell and the BNP, or its own roots in UKIP. The party’s core mission, inherited from its Brexit Party origins, is to “take back control” of Britain’s borders and laws – a message intertwined with hostility to foreigners and multilateral institutions.

“Only Reform will take back control over our borders, our money and our laws.”²⁸

Nigel Farage

While mainstream parties do also talk of controlling immigration, Reform UK’s positioning is far more extreme. Richard Tice proudly advocated a “one in, one out” immigration policy as a cap on newcomers.²⁹ Farage himself has relentlessly focused on immigration as Britain’s central crisis, often in inflammatory ways. He infamously unveiled the “Breaking Point”³⁰ poster during the Brexit campaign, depicting a long queue of Syrian refugees. Widely condemned as a blatantly xenophobic appeal to fear, he was reported to the police for inciting racial hatred by the union Unison.³¹

Image Credit BBC “Nigel Farage: Breaking point poster 'transformed politics'“ https://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-48244663

As HOPE not hate observes, Farage over the decades has increasingly targeted Muslims and migrants, suggesting that terror attacks in Britain and other countries were the result of “a fifth column”³² of disloyal Muslims inside the country. Such rhetoric casts entire communities as enemies within – a classic far-right trope.

On multiple occasions, Farage has crossed the line into outright racist or xenophobic remarks. In 2014, he mused on live radio:

“If a group of Romanian men moved in next to you, would you be concerned? … If you lived in London, I think you would be.”

Nigel Farage - BBC³³

Pressed on whether he’d feel the same about, say, German neighbours, Farage added: “You know what the difference is.”

This unsubtle insinuation – that Romanians (and for Romanians, many read ‘Eastern Europeans’) are inherently suspect or criminal compared to Germans – was condemned across the political spectrum as racist. Farage defended himself by leaning into the stereotype, citing allegedly high crime rates by Romanians. Such comments align with far-right ethnonationalism, where Europeans are hierarchically sorted into the “desirable” and “undesirable.”

Farage has also repeatedly praised Enoch Powell, of the famous “Rivers of Blood”³⁴ anti-immigration speech, as a personal hero. Early in Farage’s political career, he even ‘begged Enoch for an endorsement.’³⁵

Oliver Eagleton in the New Statesman identifies that some commentators refer to Farage’s ideology as “Powellism”.³⁶ This ideological lineage – from Powell’s racist apocalypticism to Farage's dog-whistles about immigrants flooding Britain³⁷ – situates Reform UK firmly in a far-right tradition of nativism.

Reform UK’s policy stances reinforce this. The party agitates for drastic reductions in immigration, far beyond what even the hardline wing of the Conservative Party proposes. It has called for zero or negative net immigration,³⁸ withdrawal from the European Convention on Human Rights (to enable easier deportations), and the militarisation of border enforcement.

“Leave the European Convention on Human Rights. Zero illegal immigrants to be resettled in the UK. New Department of Immigration. Pick up illegal migrants out of boats and take them back to France.”

Reform Policy Document³⁹

Hope not hate notes that Reform UK explicitly targets asylum seekers, Muslims and Islam more generally as the out-group enemies threatening the nation. For example, Reform campaigns heavily against refugees arriving on small boats, with rhetoric that treats these asylum seekers not as vulnerable humans but as invaders or criminals. It is reform policy to return those who cross the channel ‘straight back to France’. And to ‘return’ failed asylum seekers.⁴⁰

Little detail is given on how this could be achieved. Successive UK governments have got bogged down in negotiations with France, and our European neighbours may be even less willing to make concessions to a Eurosceptic far-right party. And of course, should a Reform ally like Le Pen gain power in France, given their own nativist views, by what rationale would they accept the asylum seekers back?

This demonisation echoes the far-right “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory, which claims that Western populations are being intentionally “replaced” by non-white immigrants.⁴¹ While Reform’s leaders stop short of openly endorsing that conspiracy, some officials and supporters often do so on social media. Despite the party claiming to have beefed up vetting, researchers identified racist social media history in at least fourteen vetted candidates.

We’ve uncovered candidates who have posted hate, pushed far-right conspiracies, and praised extremists. These aren’t isolated cases. This is a party that’s opening the door to hate.

Hope not Hate - ‘Reform Candidates Exposed’⁴²

For example, it’s reported that Howard Rimmer, standing for Reform UK in Doncaster, shared posts referencing The Great Replacement, and stoked fears about “Demographic Jihad” or “How Islam is colonising non-Muslim countries".⁴³

Reform UK’s upper echelons have sometimes tolerated and even echoed Islamophobic themes, which in Europe is a key marker of far-right politics. Farage has sometimes cast Islam as intrinsically problematic; after the Westminster terror attack in 2017, he generalised on Fox News about “uncontrolled immigration from Middle Eastern countries” leading to terrorism. But other times, he said he has no problem with Islam. Saying he welcomes Muslims who will fully integrate.⁴⁴

So the party nurtures the sentiment behind “Great Replacement Theory”: the idea that British culture is being “diluted” by foreigners.

Senior figures in Reform frequently blur the lines between criticising Islamic extremism and smearing Islam or Muslims at large. Reform’s official online groups are rife with supporter posts claiming it’s “hardwired into [Muslims’] belief system to kill non-believers” and that Britain faces “rapid Islamisation” – extreme statements that were left unmoderated for extended periods in forums managed by Reform UK organisers. Reform Parliamentary Candidate Nick Davies shared posts calling immigrants an ‘invasion’ and a ‘silent army’.⁴⁵

This kind of blanket demonisation of a religious minority is textbook far-right bigotry.

There is, however, a gap of plausible deniability attempted between official party statements and policies, and what seem to be the endemic views among many of their candidates, campaigners and supporters. A standing wish that the life-blood of the party could stop saying the quiet part out loud.

Also in their defence, Reform’s current chairman, one of Reform’s largest donors, is a self-styled “British Muslim Patriot” right-wing multi-millionaire, Muhammad Ziauddin Yusuf, formerly of the conservative party.⁴⁶ Having a Muslim chairperson would be excellent cover against charges of islamophobia, except that he has received -

A torrent of racist and Islamophobic abuse online. Much of it appears to be coming from social media users supportive of Reform.”

Middle East Eye, 10th March 2025⁴⁷

Reform UK’s nationalism is exclusionary. It defines the national community in terms that explicitly marginalise and vilify outsiders – whether immigrants, refugees, or Muslims. The evidence ranges from the party’s official anti-immigrant policies to the hateful propaganda shared openly in its circles, calling immigrants “foreign invaders” and praising Hitler for targeting the “right” people.

According to the Financial Times, yet another Doncaster Reform candidate, Mark Broadhurst, shared a meme showing Hitler saying “f***’s sake I’d have been a legend if I’d chosen Muslims” . These, then, do not seem isolated slips - with 100 candidates failing vetting, and at least 14 who passed vetting then being pulled because of far right-views, with far-right views expressed by supporters, then shared or left unmoderated, in Reform UK party-run forums -this is a long-standing pattern of othering and racism that squarely meets the first of our far-right criterion.⁴⁸

2. Authoritarianism and Law-and-Order Obsession:

Reform UK presents itself as the party of tough love for Britain: tough on outsiders, tough on crime, tough on “wokery.” This translates into a pronounced authoritarian streak in its policy proposals and the attitudes it promotes. Far-right movements typically glorify strength, order, and punitive measures, against political targets, and Reform UK is no exception.

“There are deeply authoritarian attitudes amongst Reform UK voters. Over half (53%) would prefer a strong leader with the power to ignore or override Parliament, while 41% believe that “in certain circumstances, violence can be necessary to defend something you strongly believe in.”

Hope not Hate Research - What Reform UK Voters Really Believe ⁴⁹

On criminal justice, Officially Reform UK advocates harsh penalties and an expansion of police powers. Increasing the number of police officers by 40,000 in five years, and to “clamp down on all crime and antisocial behaviour" with “Zero Tolerance” policing. ⁵⁰

While the party hasn’t put capital punishment in its manifesto, in the past its leaders have spoken favorably of extreme punishments in certain contexts, and 77% of its supporters want the death penalty reinstated – a policy abolished in the UK decades ago and now widely seen as a human rights violation in Europe.

Farage has said he does not personally support the death penalty, but has also said that not being able to reinstate it was a sovereignty argument against being subject to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).⁵¹

So a Reform government wouldn’t want to execute people; it just wants the right to be able to.

Reform’s messaging around law and order is laden with the implication that too soft liberal rules are hampering justice. They rage against what they perceive as an overly lenient legal system, echoing far-right calls for a more draconian state when it comes to dealing with perceived criminals from marginalised groups they portray as troublemakers– e.g., refugees, ethnic minorities, the homeless.

The party’s approach to protests and civil liberties is another red flag. There is a thinly veiled approval of using state violence to quell dissent that they disagree with. During right-wing hysterias over groups like Black Lives Matter or environmental protesters like Just Stop Oil, Reform UK figures called for harsh crackdowns and even suggested such movements should be treated as subversive. Incredibly, Nigel Farage even went so far as to blame “Black Lives Matter” for the far-right riots in 2024.⁵² Although he, himself, has helped create the racially charged environment that fanned the flames of unrest.⁵³

In 2024, Richard Tice called for “Just Stop Oil” peaceful protesters to serve full four to five-year jail terms.

To put that in context, that is longer than the average time currently served in England for Robbery, Drugs, Arson, Fraud, Violence against the person and possession of weapons.

Average custodial sentence length at all courts to immediate custody in England and Wales in 2023/24, by offence group(in months)

However, Reform UK Leader Nigel Farage supported the protest tactics of Farmers protesting against inheritance tax rises.⁵⁴ This suggests Reform do not support the right to protest in principle - only when it aligns with their beliefs or they see a political opportunity.

At the same time, when far-right anti-migrant mobs rioted – as happened in Knowsley and at hotels housing asylum seekers – Farage’s condemnation was fairly tepid. HOPE not hate’s State of Hate 2025 report highlights that the summer 2024 riots in asylum-seeker hostels were “stirred up” by extremist sentiment, and that Reform UK’s rise is part of that ecosystem. Farage did not fully distance his party from those vigilante actions; if anything, he’s exploited incidents of migrant crime to demand even more authoritarian policies.⁵⁵

Reform have also called for greater militarisation.

“We need 30,000 at least young men and women to join the army, get trained and stay as full-time soldiers,"

Nigel Farage ⁵⁶

Perhaps the most direct display of Reform UK’s authoritarian tendency is its comfort with violent or threatening language among its officials and supporters. Numerous Reform UK candidates have been exposed for sharing fantasies of violence. The Byline Times investigation found candidates posting memes approving of shooting “looters” or implying political opponents deserved violent ends

Finally, consider Reform UK’s affinity for strongman leadership. Nigel Farage’s leadership style is top-down, and he generally dominates the party’s direction and public face, with little transparency or internal democracy.

Yes, there are others in the party, such as Richard Tice. However, YouGov polling showed that even when Richard Tice was Reform leader, an incredible 37% of Reform voters polled said they didn’t know who he was.

“Reform UK voters are almost universally fans of Nigel Farage (94%). Perhaps more surprising is that relatively high numbers don’t seem to know who recent leader Richard Tice is – 37% answered “don’t know”, while 50% have a favourable view and 13% an unfavourable one.”

YouGov Poll⁵⁷

Such concentration of power can be seen as an authoritarian trait in itself – the party largely faithfully trusts the Leader to decide what’s best rather than engaging in member-driven policy development. Though, as we will see, cracks are appearing.

In essence, the party’s ethos venerates strength – whether in policing, border enforcement, or leadership – and disdains compromise or conciliation. This is strongly consistent with far-right psychology, which values obedience to a leader and a clear, forceful social order.

Taken together, these elements illustrate that Reform UK ticks the authoritarian box of far-right politics. It may lack the paramilitary aesthetics of the ‘old far-right’ 1930s style fascists, but in its policy thrust - law and order maximalism, disdain for liberal constraints - and its internal dynamics, leader-centric and hierarchical, tolerance of violent talk in it’s forums, and even in it’s corporate structure, it aligns with the far-right’s hierarchical, order-above-all mindset.

3. Populism - Anti-Elite and Conspiracy Thinking:

From its inception, Reform UK has styled itself as an anti-establishment, “people versus elite” insurgency – this is classic populism that overlaps with far-right conspiracism. Nigel Farage, a consummate populist showman, has spent years cultivating the image of a plain-speaking ‘man of the people’ battling a corrupt political class. Reform UK consistently frames Britain’s problems as the fault of a “corrupt elite” of politicians, bureaucrats, academics, judges, and media who are out of touch at best and traitorous at worst.

Cas Mudde’s definition of populism fits Reform perfectly: they depict society as split between the “pure, ordinary people” and a “devious elite” thwarting the people’s will.

This anti-elite fury is a signature element of Reform UK’s appeal, especially to voters disillusioned with mainstream parties, which Reform rhetoric classifies as the ‘Uniparty’, suggesting they are all the same.

Yet, as in most far-right populism, on closer inspection, the leaders seem to be firmly of the elite.

“Like most far-right parties, Reform claims to be anti-establishment, but it's led by a millionaire ex-banker, bankrolled by aristocrats, and pushes the agenda of landlords and fossil fuel giants. They’re merely another elite faction vying for control.”

Vladimir Bortun The Tribune ⁵⁸

But they are playing to the beliefs of their base. YouGov found Reform voters overwhelmingly believe “big businesses take advantage of ordinary people” (74%) and that “rich people can get around the law” (78%)⁵⁹ – sentiments that mirror left-wing critiques but are being channelled by Reform’s Millionaires into a right-wing populist worldview where the culprit is a shadowy globalist cabal.

Conspiracy theories abound in and around Reform’s online support. Byline Times uncovered a trove of grim content in Facebook groups administered by Reform,⁶⁰ revealing just how steeped in conspiratorial thinking the party’s online base is. Members, unchecked by moderators, shared posts claiming that “Jewish people are trying to dilute our country with foreign invaders” – a direct reference to the antisemitic Great Replacement theory, which imagines a Jewish-led plot to replace white Britons via mass immigration. Other users called for Muslims to be “lynched” in the streets and posited that the UK is on the brink of an Islamic takeover, referencing “subhuman Muslim child rapists” allegedly coddled by authorities.

Olly Haynes, “Reform UK Facebook Groups Are Full of Racist Far Right Posts and Islamophobic Conspiracy Theories,” Byline Times, April 30, 2025, https://bylinetimes.com/2025/04/30/reform-uk-facebook-groups-are-full-of-racist-far-right-posts-and-islamophobic-conspiracy-theories/.

While supporters, not official spokespeople, posted these vile statements, Reform UK has generally not proactively policed or greatly moderated such views in its ranks. On the contrary, many of these groups were explicitly promoted by Reform UK regional organisers, and even council candidates of the party acted as admins and moderators while allowing conspiratorial propaganda to flourish.

The conspiratorial mindset isn’t limited to a fringe of supporters; it is echoed, in moderated tones and with dog-whistles, by Reform leaders, campaigners and candidates. Farage frequently rails against “cultural Marxists” and “globalists”⁶¹ – buzzwords in far-right conspiracy circles that hint at a secretive elite agenda. Reform have entertained theories about the EU being under German control, or about climate change being a hoax orchestrated by vested interests. Farage has openly questioned climate science. Reform wants to scrap ‘net zero’ and instead increase Oil and Gas exploitation.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Farage opposed lockdowns and insinuated that the government response was tyrannical – positions that endeared him to the anti-vaccine and libertarian far right. Indeed, when he rebranded the Brexit Party to Reform UK, he positioned it as “an anti-lockdown party”.

Then, Hope not hate report, Reform candidate Trevor Bridgwood claimed on his facebook page that vaccines were preparing people to be microchipped.⁶² During the COVID-19 pandemic, Farage opposed lockdowns and insinuated that the government response was tyrannical – positions that endeared him to the anti-vaccine and libertarian far right. Indeed when he first rebranded the Brexit Party to Reform UK he positioned it as “an anti-lockdown party”.⁶³

In short, Reform UK - based on the views of their leaders, candidates, campaigners and supporters, have a worldview steeped in populist and conspiratorial narratives: the people are under siege by treacherous elites and dangerous aliens within, truth is being suppressed; whether about immigration,⁶⁴ crime,⁶⁵ vaccines or climate,⁶⁶ and only Reform can be trusted.

This paranoid style is a hallmark of far-right politics. It creates permission for extreme solutions by positing that the normal system is rigged or controlled by malevolent forces.

As Cas Mudde observed, they widely believe in a “devious and sinister elite…often with the ‘tool’ of political correctness” is used to oppress the people. Such views don’t arise in a vacuum – the party’s rhetoric actively cultivates them.

4 . Rejection of Pluralism and Minority Rights

A key question is whether Reform UK merely espouses hard-right conservative views within democratic norms, or whether it undermines those norms themselves. The evidence suggests the latter: Reform UK and it’s leaders consistently opposes core liberal democratic principles, particularly minority rights and institutional checks and balances, placing it in Mudde’s “radical right” category.

The clearest indicator is Reform UK’s stance on human rights frameworks. The party under Farage and Tice has repeatedly called for Britain to withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and to replace or abolish the Human Rights Act.⁶⁷ Farage argues this is necessary to “really control our borders” – essentially, wanting to remove legal protections so asylum seekers or migrants can be detained and expelled without interference from courts.

But the ECHR is a cornerstone of post-WWII liberal democracy, enshrining basic rights and the rule of law.⁶⁸ Not only that, but it was primarily drafted by British Lawyer and Conservative MP Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, a prosecutor of Nazis at the Nuremberg trials.⁶⁹

Farage’s eagerness to discard it reflects a willingness to sacrifice individual rights in the name of an exclusionary national vision.

We can see direct parallels here with the Trump administration’s extra-judicial ‘deportations’ without due process, even of US citizens and immigrants with the legal right to stay.

As the Hope not hate report put it, Reform UK “rejects key elements of liberal democracy, most notably the concept that every human being has inherent dignity and universal rights.”

This is precisely what distinguishes far-right radicalism from democractic values- they may accept elections, but they do not accept that all people are equal or entitled to certain rights regardless of majority opinion.

Beyond human rights, Reform UK figures often display contempt for other pillars of pluralistic democracy – from independent media to the judiciary. Farage is famous for his broadsides against the biased liberal media and has at times floated curbing the BBC or shaking up the media landscape to be more ideologically friendly. In actual fact, independent analysis from the University of Loughborough has shown that Farage has had media exposure far exceeding his political base.⁷⁰

Ironically, Farage positions himself as a free speech champion. The parallel is clear with far-right media owner Elon Musk, who claimed to be a ‘free-speech absolutist’ but was then found to be suppressing criticism on Twitter.

While in the European Parliament, Farage and his allies formed alliances with some of Europe’s most illiberal parties and praised strongman leaders abroad.⁷¹ He expressed admiration for Hungary’s Viktor Orbán⁷² an autocrat who has systematically dismantled checks and balances in Hungary - and he got a ‘standing ovation’ at rallies he joined for Germany’s AfD, an extremist far-right party. ⁷³ These associations underscore Reform’s ideological endorsement of far-right and authoritarian politics.

What’s more, Reform UK’s internal structure is itself anti-pluralist, resembling a fiefdom more than a democratic party. The Guardian noted that Reform was literally structured like a company with Farage as the major shareholder, and during Tice’s tenure, it had no members in the traditional sense; decisions were top-down. ⁷⁴

Following criticism of being a company, not a party, Farage had promised to democratise and hand over control to the members. However, an investigation in 2025 revealed that under the new structure, control is owned by a new non-profit company, which the leader and chair control.

This centralisation around a single leader or a small clique is characteristic of far-right populist parties, which distrust internal debate and emphasise unity behind the “strongman” figure.

Perhaps most disturbingly, Farage has shown a pattern of undermining democratic processes when they don’t suit him, much like his friend Donald Trump. He has repeatedly sown doubt about election results without evidence.⁷⁵

After losing the Oldham West by-election in 2015, Farage insinuated fraud, saying “postal voting” was suspect.⁷⁶ In 2019, he alleged irregularities in the Peterborough by-election that UKIP/Reform lost, claims that were again unsubstantiated.⁷⁷ Most recently, after Reform UK failed to win in a 2024 contest in Rochdale, Farage again hinted the result was rigged.⁷⁸ This willingness to claim fraud erodes trust in democracy and is directly in line with far-right populist tactics as seen with Trump’s “Stop the Steal” movement).

While Farage hasn’t gone as far as urging an insurrection, the constant messaging that the system is corrupt and the true people’s voice (his) is being cheated is a classic tactic of far-right politics, which often lays the groundwork for rejecting election outcomes altogether.

To summarise, Reform UK’s relationship with democracy is instrumental at best and hostile at worst. The party and its leader accept democratic power when it favours them Farage revels in his electoral victories, but they reject liberal democracy’s constraints – be it minority rights or the notion that losing fairly is part of the process.

This places Reform UK firmly in the camp of the illiberal far right, those who would hollow out democracy from within. They “accept the vote, but not the rules”, so to speak.

Guilt by association? Reform UK's Far-Right Affiliations and Extremist Influence

“Despite what Farage and Reform have claimed about professionalisation and vetting a troubling number of their candidates have been exposed for a range of extreme and unacceptable behaviour.”

Joe Mulholland - Hope not Hate

Nigel Farage and the Reform Leadership have a problem. It’s one that has dogged Farage for many years. The support of the openly far-right like Tommy Robinson.

“Nigel Farage’s winning over the people and he’s putting across our arguments to the nation very skillfully and in a great way. There is only one option at this election and that is Reform UK”

Tommy Robinson

They desperately don’t want to be labelled far-right because it has hugely unpopular negative connotations. Some of the new or radical far-right want to distance themselves from the old or extreme far-right. They have expanded their leadership with a Muslim chair, and proclaimed they are not far-right. Others want to use their platform to further move the overton window and normalise the more openely extreme. ⁷⁹

Farage has distanced himself personally from Tommy Robinson in his attempts to professionalise his parties. His Tommy problem is that he and Tommy have huge overlap in support, and to try and widen Reform support he would need to go against his core base.

“I never wanted Tommy Robinson to join UKIP. I don’t want him to join Reform UK”

Nigel Farage

Mitchell, Archie. "Reform UK Divided as Senior Figures Say Tommy Robinson Supporters 'Are Our Friends'." The Independent, November 1, 2024. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/reform-uk-tommy-robinson-nigel-farage-b2639498.html.

Unfortunately, the attempts to distance themselves and show a moderate face seems to have come as something of a surprise to their members and supporters.

“Most people supported Reform because of their concerns with Islamisation. How can anyone have faith that they will tackle it when their main funder and now chairman is a follower of Islam? What a disappointment!”

Tommy Robinson ⁸⁰

Pro–Tommy Robinson sentiment remains highly prevalent among Reform UK’s online supporters. Former co-deputy leader of the party, Ben Habib spoke approvingly about how many Reform supporters attended a ‘pro-Tommy’ rally, while Howard Cox - Reform's candidate for Mayor of London, gave a media interview saying Robinson should not be in prison.⁸¹

In this regard, Reform UK has plenty of links to known far-right actors and has attracted numerous extremists into its fold, while also deliberately excluding some, to the protest of members. Historically, Britain’s far-right scene included groups like the National Front, BNP, EDL, Britain First, etc. While Reform UK is distinct from those older fascist or street-fighting organisations, there has also been a notable crossover and historical continuity in terms of message, personnel and support.

Under Nigel Farage’s leadership, UKIP and then the Brexit Party/Reform often served as a relatively “clean” channel for far-right activists to pursue electoral influence . Farage himself in UKIP days courted figures with extremist backgrounds. As we saw earlier, he had courted ‘Rivers of blood’ speaker Enoch Powell, Janice Atkinson was an MEP for UKIP, before being expelled from the party in a dispute over expenses. She had previously courted controversy when explaining that her support for electoral reform came from her support for some BNP platform -

“she calmly explained that she was supporting AV in part because she knew that had she been able to pick up second preferences from BNP supporters by communicating to them her support for elements of their platform, she would have won her seat.”⁸²

When Farage launched the Brexit Party in 2019 (which later became Reform UK), many former UKIP members with far-right views jumped aboard. Farage has often tried to distance his projects from overt neo-Nazis to maintain respectability and widen appeal, but inescapably the core base he peronally appeals to overlaps with the far-right. In 2024, it’s reported he had to “remove more than 100 candidates for racism and extremism,”⁸³ That is not a few bad apples; that is a systemic level of value overlap.

More concrete examples emerged in 2025 when investigative journalists scrutinised Reform UK’s local candidates, as with UKIP, as with the Brexit Party, numerous Reform candidates have been caught sharing far-right propaganda, stating far-right views or interacting with far-right extremist groups.

No fewer than seven Reform election candidates in Doncaster posted Hitler memes, white nationalist articles, or antisemitic conspiracy material on their social media.

In Lincolnshire, Reform candidates were found to be open admirers of Stephen Yaxley Lennon - also known as Tommy Robinson, the former English Defence League (EDL) leader and prolific sharer of anti-Muslim conspiracy theories.

One Reform Candidate, Steve Plater formerly of UKIP, posted content from Patriotic Alternative – a neo-Nazi organisation – including racist articles blaming immigrants for various ills. Another joked approvingly about Hitler targeting Muslims.

Reform Candidate Martin Jackson shared and agreed with far-right conspiracy propaganda videos claiming that, due to advances in robotics, the elite were going to use vaccines to depopulate the world. Jackson has also complained about “the globalist hysterical climate hoax”.⁸⁴

Another candidate, Pip Robson in Bamburgh, reportedly shared propaganda from far-right Holocaust denier David Irving. Blyth candidate Rick Barker claimed, without evidence, that non-muslims are excluded from social housing, and ‘indigenous Britons’ will never get a council house.

This sampling of revelations shows that Reform UK has a serious problem with extremist infiltration; rather than a one-off bad apple, it appears many who harbour far-right extremist, racist and conspiratorial views see Reform UK as a congenial home.

What has the party leadership done about this? So far, not much. Yes, when things have gone public candidates have been pulled - There have been a few, publicised expulsions or disavowals of these candidates. But Joe Mulhall points out that Reform UK’s “track record of sticking by unsuitable candidates” suggests they are unwilling or unable to purge all those with far-right views. When they do say the views are unacceptable, it’s shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. They never address why so many of their candidates and members just happen to have abhorrent views.

This tacit acceptance further cements the impression that Reform UK is comfortable operating at the boundary with extremist movements, rather than policing a firm boundary against fascists and racists. By contrast, a genuinely non-extremist right-wing party would swiftly distance itself from any member posting Hitler-glorifying memes. Reform’s silence speaks volumes.

Farage’s personal associations also illuminate Reform’s far-right bona fides. Farage has shared stages not just with mainstream European right-wing figures but with the global far-right. He campaigned alongside Fascist Donald Trump the U.S. ⁸⁵

He gave a keynote speech at the far-right AfD’s rally in Germany,⁸⁶

Hopkins, Steven. "Nigel Farage To Speak At Far-Right Rally After Invitation From Granddaughter Of Hitler's Former Minister." HuffPost UK, September 8, 2017. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/nigel-farage-to-speak-at-far-right-rally_uk_59b2642ee4b0354e4410f26f.

and he has been repeatedly supported and been praised by France’s Far-right Marine Le Pen and others in Europe’s far-right fraternity.

Reform UK, as UKIP were before them, are seen as part of the same international trend as those parties – a trend of nationalist-populist insurgency often categorised as the “far-right wave” in the West. Farage’s appearances on platforms like CPAC and his cosiness with figures like Steve Bannon and Elon Musk further underscore this alignment.

Even media ecosystems overlap: Reform UK’s messages are amplified by GB News and similar outlets that often host far-right commentators, while Farage’s own show provides a safe space for climate deniers and anti-immigrant fearmongers. The lines between conservative and far-right media blur in this space, but the important takeaway is that Reform UK swims in a milieu where far-right ideologies thrive and spread.

The party does not exist in a hermetically sealed “not-extreme” bubble; it is integrated in networks of activists and information flows that include explicit far-right extremists.

The evidence is overwhelming that Reform UK meets our criteria of far-right politics.

It is nativist and xenophobic in ideology, illiberal and anti-pluralist in orientation, populist and conspiratorial in narrative, authoritarian in temperament, and intertwined with far-right movements historically and contemporaneously.

Little wonder that academics, journalists, and the public, when presented with the facts, largely agree that Reform UK is properly classified as far-right. Dr. Cas Mudde, perhaps the world authority, states it bluntly:

“Reform UK is far-right. That is not an opinion, that is a fact.”

Dr Cass Mudde

Far Right has an objective meaning, and Reform UK fits it.

Public Perception: Britain Sees a Far-Right Party

Reform UK’s rapid ascent has not gone unnoticed by the British public, nor have its hardline positions. Despite talk of a landslide in the press,⁸⁷ Polling data indicate that a majority of Britons already view the party as far-right. In early 2025, the anti-extremism organisation HOPE not hate commissioned a large nationwide survey, which found that over 60% of the public agreed that “Reform UK is a far-right populist party.” ⁸⁸

https://hopenothate.org.uk/2025/04/16/public-agree-reform-far-right/

This suggests that, despite Reform UK’s efforts to brand itself as mainstream, the wisdom of the crowd sees something more extreme. Notably, this poll was released alongside news that one of the country’s largest teaching unions, the NEU, had officially resolved to “class Reform UK as a far-right party” and campaign against its candidates. In other words, not only do private citizens hold this view, but influential civil society groups are sounding the alarm as well.

Why do so many people instinctively peg Reform UK as far-right? One reason may be the profile of its policies and supporters. Recent analysis by YouGov shines a light on what Reform UK voters themselves believe – and the picture is revealing.

Reform supporters are overwhelmingly hardline on immigration and multiculturalism: 86% of them agree that all migrants crossing the Channel should be “immediately removed…and never allowed to return”, and 78% say “multiculturalism has made the UK worse.”

These are not the majority views among even right-wing Conservative voters, only 47% of whom see multiculturalism as a negative. They mirror the immigration rhetoric and policies of past groups such as the National Front and BNP.

Reform UK’s base also shows an authoritarian streak, with 85% believing court sentences are too lenient and 77% favouring the reinstatement of the death penalty.

These are well beyond ordinary centre-right British values and traditions, aligning more with the type of law-and-order extremism associated with the far right. On the cultural front, Reform voters are deeply traditionalist – 89% bemoan that “young people lack respect for traditional British values” – and are hostile to liberal social changes (for instance, a large majority oppose legal gender recognition for transgender people).

Reform claims they are the voice of the people, but in practically every hot topic, Reform views are significantly divergent from most British voters.

It’s not just polls and unions applying the far-right label. Media coverage and watchdog groups routinely describe Reform UK in those terms. International outlets like Al Jazeera have dubbed Reform UK a “radical-right…anti-immigration party” led by a “Trump ally”.

HOPE not hate’s annual State of Hate report identified Nigel Farage’s Reform UK as “the biggest far-right political threat to Britain” – above neo-fascist groups or street movements – due to its electoral momentum and mainstreaming of extremist ideas.

That report noted Reform’s unprecedented success in elections (over 4 million votes, by their analysis, making it “the largest…ever for a far-right party in the UK”). Such characterisations mark a dramatic shift: a party founded by a former UKIP leader, once dismissed by sceptics as a flash-in-the-pan protest vehicle, is now widely regarded as Britain’s foremost far-right contender.

Reform UK’s leaders reject this characterisation. They insist they are a common-sense party, not extremists, and portray the “far-right” tag as a smear used by opponents to discredit genuine public concerns on immigration, crime, and sovereignty.

Indeed, Farage has built much of his career on mainstreaming ideas that were once fringe, all while denying any bigotry. A strategy of normalisation. A strategy of shifting the Overton window.

Historical Continuity: From Before UKIP and through the Brexit Party to Reform UK

Same Slogans, Same Message - Sometimes even the same faces. Reform UK are a rebrand, not a refreshing revolution.

Reform UK did not emerge from thin air. Its ideological DNA and organisational structure are direct inheritances from previous right-populist and far-right movements in Britain – they have inherited leadership and policies from the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and its short-lived metamorphosis, the Brexit Party. They have inherited support, slogans and candidates from more openly extremist groups such as the British National Party (BNP) and National Front (NF), ‘Britain First’ and English Defence League (EDL) and take links and inspiration from far-right role models such as Enoch Powell. Understanding this lineage helps explain why Reform UK displays far-right tendencies: it was born from them.

UKIP, founded in the 1990s as an anti-EU party, gradually evolved into a broader anti-immigration, anti-establishment force under Nigel Farage’s leadership. For years, pundits debated whether UKIP was far-right or just right-wing populist, but by the mid-2010s, UKIP’s relentless anti-immigrant messaging, its attraction of British National Party defectors, and its role in inciting xenophobic attitudes during the Brexit campaign firmly planted it on the far-right spectrum.

Farage led UKIP to a shock victory in the 2014 European elections on a wave of anti-EU, anti-immigration sentiment, that echoed National Front themes from earlier decades. To be fair Farage tried to keep explicit racists at arm’s length but UKIP became a magnet for the disaffected far-right crowd – from white supremacists to anti-Muslim crusaders. After Farage left UKIP in 2016, the party swung even further right under Gerard Batten, openly allying with street extremist Tommy Robinson. By then, the consensus among researchers was that UKIP had openly become a far-right party.

Farage, seeking a new vehicle post-Brexit, launched the Brexit Party in 2019, focusing solely on delivering Brexit but implicitly carrying forward UKIP’s nationalist mantle. The Brexit Party was essentially Farage’s personal party. It was structured as a company owned by him, with “registered supporters” instead of members. In a stunning result, it won the 2019 European Parliament elections, demonstrating the electoral clout of a hard-right populist message in the UK.

Although the Brexit Party didn’t articulate a full domestic policy platform initially, its raison d’être was anti-EU nationalism, often veering into anti-immigrant rhetoric as well. Many of its candidates and activists were the same people from UKIP, just rebranded, which meant the same problems with extremist views recurred. The Brexit Party collapsed after Brexit was supposedly ‘achieved’, rebranding as Reform UK in 2020 to continue beyond Brexit with a broader agenda. Lockdowns and Covid policy gave it another rallying point initially, latching onto the rightwing zeitgeist of conspiracy and counter-science.

Thus, Reform UK carries forward UKIP’s and the Brexit Party’s membership base, leadership, and ideological issues. Nigel Farage being at the helm in 2024/25 brings the story full circle.

The party’s messaging around immigration and nationalism today is virtually indistinguishable from UKIP’s in, say, 2015 – except that it may be even more strident now due to the “Historical Wrong” narrative of nationalism. (e.g., “Brexit didn’t truly deliver on cutting immigration, or Brexit wasn’t really delivered, so we need Reform to finish the job”).

The organisational continuity is also clear: many Reform UK local organisers and candidates are ex-UKIP. As HOPE not hate reported, former Tory politicians disillusioned with Rishi Sunak also defected to Reform, but importantly, far-right activists from groups like Britain First and the BNP have latched on as well, seeing Reform as the viable horse to back.

This historical context shows that Reform UK’s far-right character is not a new development but part of an ongoing evolution of Britain’s far-right ecosystem, adapting to opportunities. UKIP borrowed quotes and slogans from the National Front, moved the Overton window by mainstreaming anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim sentiments; the Brexit Party proved that a polished veneer and focus on “sovereignty” could briefly unite that sentiment for an electoral breakthrough; and Reform UK now combines all the above into a party aiming for Westminster seats.

When Farage and others protest the far-right label, it is because they want to distance themselves from the negative connotations in order to win moderate support. However, the ideological pipeline from UKIP to Reform is undeniable. Even the Times and Telegraph (hardly left-wing outlets) have described Reform UK as the “successor to UKIP” that haunts the already right-wing Conservatives from the further right. And UKIP, in its heyday, was recognised as a populist far-right party by scholars, particularly given Mudde’s classification of it as a radical right populist party. Nativist. Authoritarian. Populist.

Figures like Neil Hamilton well illustrate the continuity of personnel - disgraced ex-Tory MP, then UKIP, now with Reform and Richard Tice, the millionaire businessman with hardline views, who led Reform until Farage took over again. In essence, Reform UK clearly represents the latest evolved incarnation of Britain’s far-right populist tradition, repackaged for a post-Brexit, post-COVID era.

It has inherited the same strengths (media-savvy leadership, emotive nationalist appeal) and the same weaknesses (tolerance for racists, policy shallowness masked by slogans) as its predecessors.

Expert and Academic Views

As we created our criteria from academic sources - what do impartial experts say about Reform UK’s political classification? The consensus among most scholars of extremism and political science is that Reform UK falls on the far-right spectrum, even if it presents itself as a respectable political party. We’ve already cited Cas Mudde, who unequivocally labels Reform UK far-right “as a fact”. Mudde’s view carries weight: he is a preeminent academic who literally wrote the book on the radical right in Europe. When he sees Reform UK as far-right, it’s because the party’s defining characteristics - again, Nativism, Authoritarianism and Populism) match those in the academic framework for the definition of populist radical right.

He is the authority, but he is not a lone voice; other experts concur. Historians David Renton and Neil Davidson, both of whom study the far right, have categorised Reform UK in what they term the “non-fascist far right.” Renton and Davidson draw a distinction between traditional conservatives, radical right populists, and fascists. They place Reform UK squarely in the radical right populist category – to the right of mainstream conservatism but not yet openly fascist. This might be considered a nuance in terminology (non-fascist far right vs. fascist far right), but it underscores that by any reasonable measure, Reform is on the far-right wing of the spectrum. As mentioned in the Hope not hate analysis, “Reform UK sits comfortably in the ‘non-fascist far right’ category.” In everyday terms: they are far-right, just not neo-Nazis.

Researchers at HOPE not hate, who produce the annual State of Hate reports, are also unequivocal. In their 2024 and 2025 reports and articles, they explicitly branded Reform UK as far-right and marshalled evidence as we have discussed. Nick Lowles, CEO of HOPE not hate, warned that Reform UK’s rise heralded a new chapter for the far right in Britain, noting its ability to capture mainstream discontent and couch far-right ideas in populist rhetoric. The fact that State of Hate 2025 identified Reform, not the fragmented fascist fringe, as the primary threat confirms how experts view its significance.

Political scientists specialising in British politics have also weighed in. Matthew Goodwin is sometimes criticised as being sympathetic to some of the arguments of the populist right, but is known for studying UK populism and class Reform UK as part of a “new national populist” wave, encompassing far-right populism. Goodwin notes that parties like Reform draw on grievances over immigration and cultural change – the classic fuel of far-right parties – and that they inherited UKIP’s mantle.

Other analysts, like Prof. Tim Bale, have commented that the Conservative Party’s own policies have shifted rightward to pre-empt Reform UK, implicitly acknowledging Reform’s far-right positioning as something the Tories feel pressure from.

Some Conservative politicians and commentators have even labelled Reform UK as far-right. When Reform UK began polling around 8-10%, some Tory MPs privately (and a few publicly) described them as “UKIP on steroids” – an admission that they consider it an extremist threat. Global outlets like The Economist and The New York Times have described Farage as Britain’s far-right figurehead in analyses of European politics, grouping Reform UK with continental far-right parties.

One should note that there are a few contrarian voices. A handful of commentators argue that the term “far-right” should be reserved for explicitly anti-democratic, fascist movements, and that using it for Reform UK overstates the case. They contend that Reform is better termed “hard right” or just populist-right. However, this is a minority view and is often rooted in semantic preference rather than evidence. Most experts now use “far-right” in a broad sense, including radical right populists like Reform UK.

But the debate is largely settled in academic and expert circles as well as in public opinion: Reform UK’s ideology and actions place it on the far-right. As one observer asks if Reform UK – with its racist Facebook posts, extreme anti-immigrant stance, Islamophobia, anti-rights agenda, and far-right friends – isn’t far-right, then what is?

The Case for the Defence

“Those few bad apples that have crept in will be gone, will be long gone, and we will never have any of their type back in our organisation,” - Nigel Farage in 2024 after dropping over 100 candidates who had been found to have expressed extreme views. ⁸⁹

Critics of the “far-right” label for Reform UK offer several counterarguments. It’s important to address these in turn, both to be fair and to see if they hold up against the evidence.

1. “They are not fascists or neo-Nazis, so calling them far-right is misleading.”

This argument conflates far-right with fascist. As we discussed, far-right is a broader category. It is true that Reform UK is not a fascist organisation in the historical sense – they do not advocate a one-party totalitarian state, they do not have paramilitary squads, and they participate in elections.

This does not mean they aren’t far-right.

Modern far-right parties in Europe, from France’s National Rally to Austria’s Freedom Party, operate within democratic systems while espousing their xenophobic, illiberal agendas. Reform UK is akin to these: part of the radical right wing of the far-right family. The term “far-right” includes any party that is significantly to the right of mainstream conservatism in advocating ethnic or nativist nationalism, rejection of liberal values, etc. So the absence of swastikas does not acquit Reform UK.

In fact, insisting that only self-proclaimed fascists count as far-right would leave us unable to identify dangerous movements until it’s too late. By that standard, even Marine Le Pen (who wears suits, not armbands) would not be “far-right,” which is plainly absurd given her party’s ideologies.

2. “Reform UK is just voicing legitimate concerns of ordinary people about immigration and governance – labeling them far-right silences debate.”

Certainly, not everyone who is worried about immigration is far-right. But it’s the manner and context of Reform UK’s rhetoric that makes it far-right, not the mere fact that they discuss immigration. They don’t just propose controlled immigration; they demonise immigrants as threats and push baseless fears, portraying asylum seekers as mostly dangerous, Britain as “full” and spreading misinformation about the costs and benefits of immigration.

Reform UK’s agenda also goes beyond immigration, targeting multiculturalism, human rights laws, etc., which indicates a coherent illiberal ideology rather than a narrow policy stance. The “silencing debate” claim also rings hollow – Reform UK and its followers are loud in the public sphere. Farage literally has his own TV show. They have been given prominent exposure on TV programs. Farage is a member of parliament when he turns up. Calling Reform far-right doesn’t censor them; it analytically describes them.

3. “The far-right label is partisan name-calling by the left/establishment.”

This rebuttal suggests that “far-right” is just a slur used by opponents. It’s helpful because it acknowledges that to be far-right is not a desirable thing, so someone making this case must acknowledge that if we can then show Reform is far right, they should withdraw their support.

That in part is what this essay has sought to do - to show sources labelling Reform UK far-right include not just left-wing activists but neutral academics and poll of the public. The label is grounded in observable behaviour and policies, backed by a wealth of analysis and evidence. It’s not an ad hominem attack.

4. “Reform UK draws voters from across the spectrum, even ex-Labour; they can’t all be far-right extremists.”

It’s true that Reform UK’s voters are not monolithically ex-BNP skinheads – many are former Conservative or Labour voters dissatisfied with those parties. But a voter’s previous affiliation doesn’t change the nature of what they’re now supporting.

People may vote for far-right parties out of protest or frustration, not realising or caring about the extremism attached. Sadly, with a lack of political engagement and education, people may also vote on a poor understanding of all the connotations and implications, but this is an accepted challenge of universal suffrage.

We know that other far-right parties have lost significant votes to Reform, suggesting their manifesto and values attract them. Far Right group “Britain First” told supporters in 2024 that they would not be fielding any candidates in elections, because Reform were fielding them.

Reform’s media strategy on countering the far-right label is to win voters they know would not knowingly support the far-right, or who would recoil from thinking of themselves as far-right. That doesn’t mean the party isn’t far-right.

Many of the values of Reform UK voters, as polled, are very far-right on many measures, as we detailed via YouGov: anti-multicultural, pro-death penalty, anti-trans rights, etc So while voters might not consciously self-identify as “far-right”, their views align with that spectrum.

Reform UK Voters' beliefs are significantly different from those of both the general voter and even right-wing conservative voters, as this research from YouGov shows.

One could say Reform UK, following from decades of Overton windo shift, have normalised far-right ideas to the point that some normal people with no neo-Nazi background somehow now feel comfortable supporting them – which is even more reason to correctly label those ideas as far-right, and educate voters, lest they slip into mainstream acceptance without challenge.

5. “They may attract some far-right individuals, but it’s not a far-right party.”

The party cannot be completely accountable for every action of every supporter or voter. The claim is that with any individual example, this is a failing of an individual and is not representative of the party. But of course, candidates and leaders are representative of the party, and when considering Reform as a ‘movement’ a pattern of individual behaviours taken together in context can be used to draw reasonable conclusions. Defenders will point to candidacies being withdrawn, and to senior party leaders making statements distancing themselves from the exposed views. But it’s impossible, when viewed holistically, to not accept the pattern. It isn’t normal for a party that isn’t far-right to have to reject over 100 candidates in vetting for public far-right views, or for so many candidates that passed vetting to later expose themselves, or for them to be endorsed by more openly far-right organisations and campaigners.

At some point, if you usually get rotten apples, you need to either stop feeding people from that barrel or admit you are giving people bad apples on purpose..

All these common counterarguments generally fall short when confronted with the overwhelming concrete evidence of Reform UK’s roots, conduct and message. The label “far-right” is not used here as an insult or exaggeration, but as an analytical classification backed by scholarly frameworks and real-world observations.

Do they protest too much?

Nigel Farage and the Reform Leadership have a problem. It’s one that has dogged Farage for many years. They desperately don’t want to be labelled far right because it has hugely unpopular negative connotations that could stop them widening their appeal. But when they try to distance themselves from being perceived as far-right they upset all the more proudly far-right members and Reform advocates!

“Just when Reform started to gain momentum, Farage selects a ‘Mohammedan’ to chair his party. Islam is incompatible with British values. This is a Christian country. Does Reform stand for Christian values or diversity and inclusion?”

Calvin Robinson

They have hired a Muslim chair - who suffered racist abuse from their members, they have stated they are not far-right wink-wink, they have threatened to sue journalists who identify them as far right. They have beefed up vetting to try and filter out hundreds of the most openly far-right racist candidates from embarrassing them and, often against the vocal complaint of members, have tried to distance themselves from far-right criminals such as Tommy Robinson.

“Every party has their share, frankly, of muppets and morons”

Richard Tice

In attempts to keep their candidates from spouting right-wing racist views online, the leadership didn’t so much ask them not to be racist as just begged them not to go on social media when they had been drinking.⁹⁰

Their problem is that the shoe fits. Their ideology, methodology, rhetoric and policies attract far-right candidates, far-right voters, and support from far-right media, groups and extremists. The very number of times they have tried to deny being far-right suggests a correlation beyond coincidence.

So, after this deep investigation, the answer is clear: Yes.

By the accepted contemporary academic consensus definition of the term ‘far-right’, as used by academics as an umbrella term that includes ‘new far right’ and ‘radical far right’, as used by extremism experts, by media and as understood by the public generally, Reform UK fit into the ‘radical far-right’ category.

We began with the compelling data point that over 60% of Britons already perceive Reform UK as far-right. We questioned whether that perception was accurate. Our analysis suggests that it is. Reform UK - taking into account the common views of their leaders, candidates and supporters, and acknowledging that the general outlook may not equally apply to every concerned individual, while not fascist, are on the whole a far-right movement.

• Ideologically, it is nativist and nationalist, often defining an in-group of “real Britons” in opposition to demonised out-groups (immigrants, Muslims, “globalists”). Its policy agenda centers on exclusion, whether that’s stopping virtually all asylum and immigration or withdrawing from international human rights accords to curtail individual protections. We have seen other far-right groups step aside from electoral votes in order to clear the way for Reform because they believe that Reform has won the votes of their own far-right base.

• Rhetorically, numerous candidates and supporters engage in racist and xenophobic scare-mongering. From Farage’s own troubling statements about Romanians and Muslims to memes of hate in its online supporter spaces where there are calls for attacking Muslims and propagation of antisemitic conspiracies, the party’s ecosystem fuels animus against minorities in classic far-right fashion.

• Structurally and psychologically, it often embodies authoritarian populism. It rallies against elites and pluralism, promises to vest power in a singular “will of the people,” yet holds views different from the British people in general and undermines democratic norms whenever convenient. Its leadership model is a personality cult around Farage, brooking little internal dissent, much like other far-right populist parties across Europe.

• Historically, in it’s policies, rhetoric, slogans it is successor to a far-right populist lineage from Enoch Powell through the National Front and UKIP. What we see in Reform UK today is a continuation of the radical right surge that began decades ago, rebranded but ideologically consistent, and with many of the same names and faces.

• In practice, its candidates and supporters have frequently espoused outright far-right extremist content - literal Hitler memes, white-nationalist dog whistles, Racist misinformation, dehumanisation, and while they say there have been attempts at tighter vetting, the party has repeatedly failed to convincingly and completely repudiate these elements. Seeing who got through the vetting makes me wonder which supporters they turned away. The boundaries between Reform UK and more extreme actors are porous, not solid.
  

So they are ‘Far Right - So What?

Identifying Reform UK as far-right is not an exercise in demonisation for its own sake – it carries significant implications. It signals that the Overton window - the range of acceptable political debate- is shifting alarmingly. Ideas that were once relegated to fascist pamphlets – that immigrants are invaders orchestrated by secret globalist cabals, that Britain should abandon human rights commitments, that vaccines are going to be used to depopulate the world for the elite– are now being advanced by a party with national influence.

This presents a challenge to Britain’s democratic values of equality, inclusion, and rule of law. If Reform UK continues to rise as polls and local election gains in 2025 suggest it might the pressure on mainstream parties will intensify to confront these far-right ideas. Or worse, to ape them to try and shore up support.

There is also an international dimension. Britain is not isolated from global trends. The far-right populist wave has seen parties like Reform UK make gains from Brazil to Hungary to the United States. Nigel Farage and Reform UK are connected to this international network of the far-right – learning from it, contributing to it, and potentially benefiting from its resources - the spectre of fascist enabler Elon Musk boosting Reform UK via social media algorithms and donations has been raised. Reform have claimed they want to recreate Musk’s “DOGE” slashing of services and funding in every English council. The normalisation of Reform UK has stakes beyond British shores, as it would mark another advance for far-right populism in the Western world.

Conversely, calling Reform UK far-right – accurately naming it – is a step towards inoculating the public against its more dangerous ideas. Using the correct terminology retains the power to marginalise truly extreme politics and can help slow or even reverse the normalisation.

Journalists should not give Reform UK a pass out of fear of legal threats or misguided both-sidesism; they should scrutinise and describe it with clear-eyed honesty. Likewise, voters deserve to know when a candidate represents a party that falls outside the democratic mainstream in values.

Whether Reform UK’s rise stalls or accelerates will be one of the decisive factors in Britain’s near-future political landscape. But irrespective of its electoral fortunes, understanding its true nature is essential. Reform UK may wear smart suits and talk about “common sense”, but beneath that veneer we can see the habits and thoughts of far-right extremism – a fact we ignore only if we choose not to look.

Britain faces a choice: confront the far-right ideology of Reform UK head-on with the facts, or allow it to entrench further under the guise of ‘ common-sense’ populism.

This article has sought to provide those facts. The rest is up to the readers, the media, and the political class to act upon. In a healthy democracy, truth and accountability must trump fear and false moderation.

Reform UK is a far-right party.

Now what are we going to do about it?

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